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GAGGED BUT NOT BOUND: THE INEFFECTIVENESS
OF THE RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN
SPEECH

Max Minzner*
JOHN DIXON DOESN'T THINK 20 STAB WOUNDS ARE ENOUGH
....
On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, six Justices agreed
with the death sentence. ONLY JOHN DIXON DIDN'T ....

HE

DIDN'T THINK MORE THAN 20 TIMES WAS ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY
THE DEATH PENALTY WHAT ABOUT YOU? THERE COMES A
TIME TO DRAW THE LINE. THE TIME IS NOW.'
Justice John Dixon's opponent ran this ad in a 1984 race for the Louisi2
ana Supreme Court. A large dagger was printed next to the advertisement.
Jay B. Mallot, Jr Raped a Three Year Old Girl. He was found guilty
and given 15 years in prison ....

But--the story isn't over. One of

Alaska's Supreme Court Justices, Jay Rabinowitz, tried to reduce his
sentence. Thankfully, he was voted down by the other Justices.
Justice Jay Rabinowitz has ruled continuously in favor of the
criminals over the victims as he attempted in this case involving the
rape and sexual abuse of a child.
Justice Jay Rabinowitz wrote the decision legalizing marijuana in
Alaska ....
Justice Jay Rabinowitz, in hundreds of cases and decisions, has
shaped the Alaskan tort system, which has driven up medical and insurance costs and literally forced many businesses to close down!3
The American Bar Association (A.B.A.) has made a concerted effort to
restrict campaign speech in judicial races. Canon 5A(3)(d) of the A.B.A.
Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("the Canon") tries to prevent candidates
from promising voters that the candidate will decide cases in a particular way
if elected:
A candidate for a judicial office: .

.

. shall not: (i) make pledges or

promises of conduct in office other than the faithful or impartial performance of the duties of the office; [or] (ii) make statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases or
*

Law Clerk, Judge Pamela Rymer, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-

cuit. J.D. Yale Law School, 1999. I would like to thank numerous readers for their helpful suggestions, in particular Dean Anthony Kronman. A special thanks to all the judges and judicial
candidates who mailed their literature to me, making the empirical section of this article
possible.
1. SHREVEPORT JOURNAL, Sept. 20, 1984, at 1 lA in ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS CAMPAIGNS 69 (Patrick M. McFadden, ed., 1990).
2. See id. at 69.
3. Id. at 80. This ad ran in an Alaska retention election.
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controversies that are likely to come before the court. 4
In some areas, this "gag rule" suggests that candidates cannot send certain
messages to voters. For instance, they cannot promise to favor plaintiffs in
their messages.
However, the Alaska and Louisiana examples discussed above also send
messages to the voters about cases. Dixon's opponent told voters he would be
tougher on murderers than the incumbent; the Alaskan advertisement implied
that whoever replaced Rabinowitz would deal more harshly with child molesters. These statements are more circumspect than direct promises, but they
have the same impact. Voters learn how judges will rule in future cases. Without saying so explicitly, judges can imply that they will be tougher in criminal
cases than their opponents. 5
Curiously, it is not at all clear that these types of statements are prohibited by the Model Code. Disciplinary cases involving the more traditional explicit statements of policy views exist. Cases where candidates are accused of
violating the Canons through insinuations and innuendo are much more rare.
Candidates cannot say they will punish DWI offenders harshly. 6 Yet, suggestive comments about a candidate's record, such as "I have always punished
DWI offenders harshly," are unlikely to be sanctioned, even though they may
7
send the same message to voters.
Whether these implied commitments are different from express promises
depends on the motivating factor behind the Canon. If the goal is to uphold
the public appearance of the courts, a difference does exist, since implied
promises are by their nature more covert than express ones. However, if the
goal is to prevent judges from winning elections based on promises of biased
decisions, whether the promises are explicit or sub rosa matters little. This article argues that while the text and the history of the gag rule would seem to
indicate that implied commitments are prohibited, candidates have a wide variety of methods available to signal voters how they might decide cases if they
reach the bench. Courts have failed to recognize the importance of limiting
speech other than traditional policy promises due to a failure to adequately
consider the most important motivating factor behind the gag rule: providing
litigants impartial adjudication. Because courts have not made this the primary
4. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (1990). [hereinafter MODEl
CODE].

5. Indeed, these statements may be more effective than outright promises. Rather than
simply being more campaign promises from more politicians, they have the apparent infallibility
of all factual statements. Almost certainly, Rabinowitz and Dixon wrote those dissents. Not only
are the statements potentially more effective, they are safer for the candidate. They can imply
how they will decide cases, but not be bound as they would by promising to vote a certain way.
6. See In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988) (en banc).
7. "Advisory opinions aside, no judicial candidate, so far as can be determined, has ever
been disciplined for truthfully reporting a suggestive record fact." ELECTING JUSTICE, supra note
1, at 82. Patrick McFadden wrote this in 1990. But see Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd.,
997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993) (overturning the gag rule on First Amendment grounds). McFadden correctly notes that advisory opinions exist, but they too are rare and often do not involve
campaigns. See Tex. Ethics Op. No. 191, Jan. 24, 1996 (holding that judges cannot write articles on decided cases, but analyzing the issue of prohibiting commentary about cases under Canon 3, rather than Canon 5).
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consideration in the gag rule cases, speech occurs in campaigns that would
otherwise be forbidden under the Canon.
I propose a new, functional interpretation of the gag rule. The Canon is
rooted on the concept that there are messages that candidates want to send that
voters should not hear. We have decided to deny a constituency that feels illinformed the information that it most wants. 8 The reason we have chosen this
approach is to prevent voters from picking judges based on how they will decide cases. 9 The implied content of a candidate's statements should be analyzed and it should be determined what voters will glean from this content.
Statements should be forbidden if they cause constituents to vote based on
how judges will decide cases.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Part I is a history of the
gag rule, examining how it developed into its modem form. Both the language
and the history indicate that implied, as well as express, commitments are
within the intent of the gag rule. Part II, however, shows the real world effect
of the gag rule. I surveyed the judges who ran for the highest state appellate
courts around the country and acquired as much of their campaign literature as
possible. The material shows that candidates can and do signal voters in the
ways the Canon hopes to prevent. Part III analyzes the major cases involving
alleged violations of the gag rule, showing that courts have paid insufficient
attention to the goal of impartial adjudication, causing the current prevalence
of implied promises. The conclusion presents two benefits of a functional interpretation. First, a functional interpretation of the Canon would be constitutional under the First Amendment. Second, it provides a clear sanction, something the current Canons lack. Judges who have sent these signals to voters
8. See Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Judicial Accountability vs. Responsibility: Balancing the Views of Voters and Judges, 65 JUDICATURE 470, 475 (1982) (hereinafter Judicial Accountability] (finding that the "past record of the judge" and "attitudes on substantive legal issues" were two of the factors voters said they wanted to know the most about);
see also Nicholas P Lovrich, Jr. et. al., Citizen Knowledge and Voting in Judicial Elections, 73
JUDICATURE 28 (1989); Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Knowledge and Judicial
Voting: The Oregon and Washington Experience, 67 JUDICATURE 234 (1983) for evidence that
voters feel uninformed about judicial elections. These articles are all largely based on the same
set of survey data done in the early 1980s. Unfortunately, few follow-up surveys of voter attitudes in judicial elections have been done.
9. Whether the gag rule is beneficial has been extensively debated. The argument over
the philosophical underpinnings of the gag rule and the model of judging it presumes that it will
continue to exist for a very long time. See, e.g., J. David Rowe, Note, A ConstitutionalAlternative to the ABA's Gag Rules on Judicial Campaign Speech, 73 TEX. L. REv. 597 (1995) (mixed
views on the appropriateness of the gag rule); Matthew J. O'Hara, Note, Restriction of Judicial
Election Candidates' Free Speech Rights After Buckley: A Compelling Constitutional Limitation? 70 CR1-KENT L. REv. 197 (1994) (anti-gag rule); Daniel Burke, Note, Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 7B(1)(c): Toward the Proper Regulation of Speech in Judicial Campaigns, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 181 (1993) (pro-gag rule); Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and
Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech by Candidatesfor Judicial Office, 35 UCLA
L. REv. 207 (1987) (anti-gag rule). I do not attempt to support or defend the gag rule. This research could support either the position that the gag rule does not work because it is too weak
or the stance that the gag rule should be eliminated because it is ineffective. I assume the gag
rule is good, or at least, here to stay. I claim that the Canon is not doing what it is supposed to
do - preventing voters from selecting candidates based on which litigants the candidate will
favor.
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must recuse themselves in cases involving issues toward which they have
shown a bias.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE GAG RULE
No general, formal rules on judicial conduct existed for most of the nation's history. The year 1924 marked the first attempt at designing an American code of judicial conduct. The goal of the Canons was to protect litigants'
right to impartial adjudication. Canon 13 stated that a judge "should not suffer
his conduct to justify the impression that any person can improperly influence
him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank, position or influence of any party or other person." 10 The 1924 version of the
Code even imposed a gag rule:
A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer others to
make for him promises of conduct in office which appeal to the cupidity or prejudices of the appointing or electing power; he should
not announce in advance his conclusions of law on disputed issues to
secure class support, and he should do nothing while a candidate to
create the impression that if chosen, he will administer his office
with bias, partiality or improper discrimination."
The Canon does not clearly state what is acceptable, yet it indicates that the
goal is protecting parties.
The new Canons were extremely popular at the time of their introduction. 2 The commentary, though, does indicate a substantial suspicion about
whether judges were treating litigants equally. "If Judges had nowhere transgressed by accepting presents or favors from litigants or lawyers, or made indiscreet investments or speculated on margin, why go so elaborately into the
nature of these offenses against judicial ethics?"' 13 The Philadelphia Public
Ledger echoed this sentiment. "[T]he very formulation of the principles here
expressed, and by an authority such as this, is proof enough that there are
Judges who need some such ethical reminders as are here contained."' 14 The
concern reflects a belief that judges were not treating litigants fairly and
impartially.
10. REPORT OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, at 764 (1927) (quoting CANONS OF JUDICAL ETHics Canon 13 (1924)) [hereinafter A.B.A.
REPORT].
11. Id. at 768 (quoting

CANONS OF JUDIcAL

ETHIcs, supra note 10, Canon 30).

12. The American Bar Association described the Code of Judicial Ethics as "[p]erhaps the
outstanding feature of the meeting." Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 1059, 1063 n.17 (1996) (quoting Forty-Seventh
Annual Meeting Maintains Association's High Standard, 10 A.B.A.J. 555, 555 (1924)). The
more objective popular press also hailed the new codes with substantial fanfare. "There is
plenty of room off the judicial bench for anyone who regards that standard as too seriously restrictive of individual freedom." Press Comments on Proposed Code of Judicial Ethics, 9
A.B.A.J. 191, 191 (1923) (quoting COLUM. DISPATCH) [hereinafter Press Comments].
13. Press comments, supra note 12 (quoting N.Y.

14. Id.

(quoting PHILADELPHIA PUB. LEDGER).

WORLD).
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Sometimes it can be said that a judge's point of view too greatly influences his decisions. Sometimes judges become autocratic. Often
they are disposed to procrastinate and to defeat justice by delaying it.
None of these failings creates quite the same despair for democracy
as the occasional evidence that one has of intimacy between judges
and politicians who are not above asking favors. When a litigant
stands in court and sees an influential friend of the party whispering
familiarly to a smiling jurist, one [sic] gets sick at heart. 5

The popularity of the 1924 Canons waned as time passed. The 1924 Canons were subject to substantial criticism for their vagueness. 16 The goal behind the 1972 revisions was to shift the Canons from a list of moral exhortations to a particular guide of conduct; therefore, the Traynor Commission
substantially rewrote the Code.' 7 This transformation was largely accomplished
by adding specific lists of permissible judicial activities. For instance, the prohibition against taking gifts in the 1924 Code was nothing more than "he
should not accept any presents or favors from litigants, or from lawyers practicing before him or from others whose interests are likely to be submitted to
him for judgment."' 8 The Traynor commission transformed this to:
Neither a judge nor a member of his family residing in his household should accept a gift, bequest, or loan from anyone except as
follows:
(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to public testimonial to him, a
book supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official
use, or an invitation to the judge and his spouse to attend a bar-related function or activity devoted to the improvement of the law, the
legal system, or the administration of justice;
(b) a judge or member of his family residing in his household may
accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift, bequest, favor or loan from
a relative; a wedding or engagement gift, a loan from a lending institution in its regular course of business on the same terms generally
available to persons who are not judges; or a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms as to other applicants.
(c) a judge or member of his family residing in his household may
accept any other gift, bequest, favor or loan only if the donor is not
a party or other person whose interests have come or are likely to
come before him, and, if its value exceeds $100, the judge reports is
in the same manner as he reports compensation in Canon 6C.19
15. Id. (quoting RICHMOND NEws-LEADER).

16. Justice Traynor, Chair of the 1972 Commission that revised the Canons, described the
older version as "[n]icely encased ... in the language of 1924, [but] lack[ing] substance for
survival an [sic] generation later ...Forty years later [the time from 1924 to 1964 when the
revision process began] the Canons were no more than picturesque in their goodness. They were
far from good enough to serve as signals for judges .....
Roger J. Traynor, The Code is
Clear, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 333, 333.

17. For background on the transformation, see John F. Sutton, Jr., A Comparison of the
Code of ProfessionalResponsibility with the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 355.
18. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 10, at 769 (quoting CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHiCs, supra
note 10, Canon 32).
19. A.B.A. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDmUcr Canon 5B(4) (1972). The 1990 revisions
modified this section. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Canon 4D(5).
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This section of the Code became more specific, allowing gifts from litigants if given in ordinary interactions. The Code recognized that these are unlikely to cause the judge to treat one class of litigants differently from
20
another.
The gag rule became Canon 7(B)(1)(c) in the new Model Code, reading:
"A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for judicial office ...should not
make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office [or] announce his views on disputed legal or political issues."'21 This section of the Code received little commentary at the time.22 However, the gag rule proved to be one of the most
controversial sections of the 1990 Code. The 1990 revisions to the Model
Code involving the gag rule were substantial, and were heavily discussed. The
new Code changed the language forbidding a candidate from "announc[ing]
his views on disputed legal or political issues."23 The current Code now prohibits candidates from "making statements that commit or appear to commit
the candidate with respect to cases or controversies likely to come before the
court. '24 The older language had come under fire as being unnecessarily
broad in scope, failing the First Amendment requirement for narrow
25
tailoring.
The new language is more closely tied to the goal of upholding the impartiality of judges and is aimed less at the stature of the courts. It is restricted
to the issues on which the judges might have to rule. If the goal was to protect the public perception of judges, a restriction on discussion of all legal issues could be supported, as the stature of courts is damaged whenever judges
descend into political topics. However, since the concern is protecting litigants, judges can be permitted to speak out on foreign policy and other topics
not related to cases they may see. The language also seems to prohibit implied
promises. While the old rules barred announcements, pledges or promises,
which generally would indicate only explicit commitments were outlawed, the
1990 Canon requires that candidates also avoid statements that appear to commit them if elected. This recognizes that even if candidates are not promising
action, they still may be indicating how they might decide cases.
One of the concerns in reshaping the Canon was "protect[ing] candidates
from improper questioning in questionnaires and opinion polls, and from other
requests from interested persons or groups for specific responses on issues. '26
This report and the committee notes accompanying Section 5A(3)(d) reflect a
declining concern over the unseemliness of judges campaigning as politicians.
For the first time, the Canon explicitly provides that the "[s]ection does not
20. Like the 1924 Code, the vast majority of states adopted the 1974 Model Code with
minor modifications. Only Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin chose to design their own
codes. See JEFFERY M. SHAMAN, ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.02, at 4 (2d ed.
1995).
21. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Canon 7(B)(1)(c).
22. For example, the 1972 Utah Law Review devoted to the new Canons does not mention the rule. See generally 1972 UTAH L. REV. 333-478.
23. MODEL CODE, supra note 4.
24. Id., Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii).
25. See Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1993).
26. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, at 846 note on Canon 5.
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prohibit a candidate from making pledges or promises respecting improvements in court administration. '27 Commentary that the court system is badly
run is likely to cause listeners to lose faith in the judicial system, perhaps
more quickly than pure politicking. The call for administrative reform directly
asserts that the current legal system is not working correctly. What they do not
say - what the Canon is designed to prevent - is that the wrong litigants
are winning.
The language and history of the Canon indicates that express and implied
commitments are covered. The trend from 1924 to 1990 was to tie the requirements ever more closely to protecting the ability of litigants to get an impartial determination of their claims. If this is the motivating concern behind the
Canons, it does not matter whether the statements that candidates make are express or implied. Both types of statements provide a way for candidates to signal how they decide cases. However, as Part II shows, candidates currently
make implied commitments and signal to voters how they will treat particular
litigants.
H. THE 1996 CAMPAIGN
While academic debates rage over the appropriateness and constitutionality of the gag rule, no one has studied the Canon's effect on actual elections.
No studies have been conducted on what candidates say to voters and what
messages are conveyed by what they say. 28 If the Canon does not constrain
candidate speech, then arguments proclaiming an unacceptable abrogation of
the First Amendment lose much of their force. However, if elections have degraded to nothing more than commentary on "the man in the moon and the
weatherman, ' 29 then those defending the Canon must rethink their position.
This Part attempts to analyze what voters actually hear from candidates-what
messages judges send to their constituents. The evidence shows that while explicit commitments are rare, candidates have developed a variety of methods
that do indicate to voters what the candidate would do if elected. If the goal
of the gag rule is to protect the right of litigants to impartial adjudication of
their claims and to then protect judges who wish to be impartial from unreasonable political pressure, then substantial weaknesses exist in the system of
regulating judicial speech.
I surveyed the candidates for the highest state courts, attempting to obtain
their campaign literature. Eighteen states either never elect Supreme Court Justices or did not have elections in 1996.30 Of the remaining thirty-two, thirteen
27. Id. commentary to Canon 5A(3)(d)).
28. In fact, I only know of one empirical study on the effect of any of the Canons of Judicial Conduct. See Leona C. Smoler & Mary A. Stokinger, Note, The Ethical Dilemma of
Campaigning for Judicial Office: A Proposed Solution, 14 FORDHAM URB. L. 353 (1986), for
an analysis of the former Canon 7B(2), now incorporated into Canon 5C(2). Smoler and Stokinger surveyed judges to get their opinions on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the limitations on judicial solicitation and acceptance of campaign funds.
29. Florida Sup. Ct. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 78-13
(1978).

30. These states are Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
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only held retention elections and nineteen held head-to-head races. 3 In May of
1997,32 I called the candidates from the states with head-to-head races and re3 3 In the end, I received literature from eighquested literature from their races.
34
races.
fifteen
in
teen candidates
The rest of this section involves an analysis of the literature, looking at
both what candidates said and how they said it. The approach I use is what I
have described as "functionalist analysis." What do voters learn about candiCarolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia.
31. Head to head races occurred in: Alabama, Arkansas (3 seats), Georgia (3 seats), Idaho
(2 seats), Kentucky (3 seats), Louisiana (2 seats), Michigan, Minnesota (2 seats), Mississippi (2
seats), Montana (2 seats), Nevada (2 seats), New Mexico (2 seats), North Carolina (2 seats),
North Dakota, Ohio (2 seats), Texas (4 seats), Washington (3 seats), and West Virginia (2 seats).
While Wisconsin did not hold a 1996 election, its 1997 supreme court race was included.
32. The timing of the survey presents a methodological problem. I did not begin to collect material until early 1997, months after elections were over. A higher response rate might
have been achieved had the survey occurred in October of an election year. While individuals
are candidates, they are avidly focused on distributing their material. Quite reasonably, after the
race is over, their interest wanes, resulting in a skewed distribution in the sample I received.
While the winners in various races were easy to locate, given that they are now all supreme
court justices working in state office buildings, the losers were harder to find. I was not able to
contact seven of the individuals who ran and lost. While I did end up with literature from eight
losers and ten winners, I only had literature from two of the losers because their opponent
mailed it along with his or her own. The effect of an imbalance between winners and losers is
not clear. An argument could be made that winners were more likely to have distributed literature communicating content to the voters, which led to their victory. Equally plausible, losers,
knowing they were likely to lose, were more likely to gamble with what they decided to distribute. Which side one takes on this issue is likely reflective of how effective one believes issue-based statements are in these races. The greater their effect, the more likely candidates who
made use of them won. At least one study seems to indicate that substantive issues may
strongly affect voters. See Sheldon and Lovrich, Judicial Accountability, supra note 8. Admittedly, the results simply show that voters want this type of information from their candidates,
and what voters say they want to know and what actually determines voting behavior may be
different.
33. Retention elections were excluded to keep the items received comparable. Only first
and second place finishers were included from multi-candidate races. I received literature of a
variety of types, ranging from standard palm cards to faux newspapers that are exclusively
about the candidate. However, it is all written media distributed directly to voters. I limited the
survey to print media for convenience. While a very useful study could be done of television
and radio advertising, examples of those ads are obviously more difficult to collect by mail.
34. Of the thirty-seven head-to-head races, eleven featured unopposed candidates who did
not distribute literature; three candidates in contested races either did not distribute literature or
had disposed of all that was left. Three candidates sent literature distributed by their opponents.
Unfortunately, this was the only source of literature from two candidates. This methodology of
collecting literature has clear weaknesses. Primarily, it likely excludes the most inflammatory
messages put forward to the voters. Candidates who distributed literature on the borderline of
ethical rules may have chosen not to participate in the survey. Additionally, print media is unlikely to be the medium of distribution candidates choose when cutting close to the edge of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Messages distributed on paper persist longer than radio
or television advertisements and convey emotive content less effectively. If anything, therefore,
the survey material probably tends toward the restrained rather than the flamboyant. Evidence of
this can be seen in the literature candidates sent in that had been distributed by their opponents.
Two of the three pieces of literature sent in by the candidate's opponent seemed like they might
violate the ethics rules. In contrast, no candidate sent me literature of his or her own that was
on the edge. Of course, candidates are more likely to send in their opponents' literature if it
seems to violate the Canons.
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dates when candidates put forward this message? The literature shows that
candidates, either consciously or unconsciously, have selected modes of
campaigning that can be read to communicate a tremendous amount about
how they may decide cases. While some of the statements could be read in a
candidates might rule, they have
different light, if voters are interested in how
35
a substantial amount information available.
A. Slogans

The concept of a sound bite has traveled from legislative and executive
campaigns to judicial ones. Candidates identify themselves by a tag line. This
is perhaps the easiest and most common way candidates send messages to the
public. 36 It can tell the voters exactly where the candidate stands. It has the
advantage of directness; voters are unlikely to misunderstand the content. It
has the disadvantage that disciplinary commissions are equally unlikely to
make that error. A number of the cases where candidates have been sanctioned
have involved the use of inappropriate slogans.37 One example a candidate
used this election cycle, "Integrity, Honesty, Competence," is clearly innocuous. It associates the candidate with broad, non-controversial values that say
nothing about particular litigants or cases that might come before the court.
Similarly, "Making Our Courts Work For You"' 38 makes a generic statement

about judicial reform. A very common choice of slogans used some variant on
Candidates would identify themselves as a "Devoted
the family values theme.
' 39
[Spouse] and [Parent].
35. I am not primarily attempting to determine whether candidates did or did not violate
the current ethics rules. These rules, of course, vary from state to state. While many are substantially identical to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, many are not. My intent is to determine what signals the voters might receive from the campaign literature and how that relates to
the goals of the Canons. Several of the judges I spoke to asked me not to reveal their names in
connection with their literature. After much consideration, I agreed to keep them anonymous in
order to obtain the most material possible. Of course, I could not identify some and leave others
anonymous, so I have excluded all candidate names. This means I will avoid referring to candidates by state as well.
36. The most common tool used by every candidate I surveyed was name pushing. It is
the most prominent item on each piece of literature. This prominence is certainly sensible from
a campaign standpoint. Name identification is one of the most important factors in judicial elections. See, e.g., PHILLip Dunois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELEcIONS AND THE QUEST
FOR AccouNTABiLrry 80-89 (1980). This name pushing is essentially a content-less statement.
Candidates are asking voters to vote for them because the voter has heard of the candidate,
nothing more. The signal that is being sent is nothing more than: "I exist." The gag rule never
contemplated reaching this sort of speech. The danger many critics of the gag rule point to is
that this becomes the only factor that voters may use and that "the election [will] be a pure
popularity contest based on name recognition alone." In re Baker, 542 P.2d 701, 705 (Kan.
1975). As the rest of this Part points out, we are not yet at that catastrophe. Anyone advocating
for gag rule expansion and greater restrictions on judges, though, must recognize that name
pushing, already playing a substantial role in the campaign literature, will only become more
widespread.
37. See, e.g., In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740 (Ind. 1997); Deters v. Judicial Retirement and
Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Ky. 1994).
38. Source on file with author.
39. Source on file with author.
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A more interesting example is: "No Money From Lawyers!" 4 The candidate using this slogan emphasized it heavily, placing it on everything he distributed from bumper stickers to brochures to lapel pins. This slogan sends no
message about decisions the judge might make involving particular litigants or
classes of litigants. Presumably, every party appearing before the court is represented by a lawyer. It does send an implied signal about those who do take
money from lawyers, though. It is intended to indicate that those who do take
money from lawyers are affected by it. The obvious interpretation is that
judges will favor lawyers who donated and rule against those who did not.
41
The drafters of the Canons seem to agree with this view.
The slogans that send the signals that the Canons are trying to prevent,
tend to involve crime. One candidate ran on a very simple slogan: "Citizens
should be safe, victims protected, and criminals punished. '42 Similarly, another
used "[s]trong record against violent crime and a strong supporter of victims'
rights. '43 This content is non-controversial, of course, but is designed to indicate a perspective to the voter. A constituent asked to compare judicial candidates, one who ran on this slogan and one who did not, would almost certainly view this candidate as more likely to be somewhat "tougher" on crime.
This is certainly the signal desired.
More serious examples of crime sloganeering exist as well. One challenger included on the outside of a public mailing the question: "Is your child
safe from drug dealers with [the opponent] as judge?" 44 and the statement
"Stop letting crime pay. Vote 'NO' to [the opponent] for Supreme Court. '45 A
large skull and crossbones emblem adorned the exterior of the mailing. Inside
the pamphlet were further slogans. "[The opponent] defends drug dealers ....
[The opponent] is soft on crime . . . . [The candidate] is tough on crime ....
Get tough on crime. Vote [the candidate]. Supreme Court Judge. ' 46 Here the
candidate may not be explicitly promising to treat drug dealers more harshly
than other litigants, but the intention is clear. This candidate will not be as soft
on drug peddlers as his opponent; if you want harsh treatment for drug dealers, this is the candidate to elect.
A second candidate followed a similar approach. The outside of the pamphlet asked "Why Does Our Criminal Justice System Still Let Criminals 'Get
Away With Murder?' Because we can't change the system until we change the
Courts. '47 It also stated that "[ilt's time to take a stand for law abiding citizens. '48 The text of the inside was almost entirely slogans:
40. Source on file with author.
41. Model Code Canon 5C(2) prohibits solicitation of funds from attorneys or acceptance
of money directly. Using a campaign committee to shield the candidate from the donations is
acceptable. While this does not explicitly state that money has a corrupting influence, it clearly
is motivated by that concern.
42. Source on file with author.
43. While this is also a statement about the candidate's record, it lacks specific information, so I decided to consider it a slogan.
44. Source on file with author.
45. Source on file with author.
46. Source on file with author.
47. Source on file with author.
48. Source on file with author.
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This Time We Can Put The Criminals and The Current System Away.
You may not be an attorney. But you rely on the criminal justice system.
We all do.
Women are murdered in their own homes during robberies. Patrons
are gunned down in grocery store parking lots. In fine neighborhoods, at
shopping malls, and at ATM machines innocent people are robbed, assaulted and killed.
Face it. We Are All Targets.
Many of the people charged with violent crimes have prior criminal
records but have escaped fitting punishment of past crimes. All thanks to
special deals and plea bargains. We're not talking about a few cases. Over
90% of [this state's] cases involve special concessions to criminals. We're
talking about the safety of your family.
The Future Of The Criminal Justice System For The Rest of the Century Depends On The 1996 Election.
[This candidate] is the first good chance to seize the moment and alter the way our justice system favors the criminal. [This candidate] is running for Chief Justice of the [State] Supreme Court. He is a conservative.

[The candidate] Has Seen The Deal Making Process First Hand And
He Wants to Stop It.
[This candidate] will work to reform the plea bargaining process. He
supports a crime victim's amendment to the state Constitution. He wants to
put accountability back into the system.

The Next Chief Justice Will Serve For Eight Years. Most Felons
Won't Be In Prison That Long.
The people who like the judicial system the way it is have most of
the money. The people who are okay with light sentences for hardened
criminals have the media's attention. We have you. And the truth.

Enclosed is my contribution of $_
to fight crime and stand up for
49
crime victims and the citizens in [this state].
The most interesting aspect of this piece of literature is that it arguably
does not violate the Code of Judicial Ethics. While it would depend on the
state, the only item that could be considered a "pledge or promise" would be
the call for plea bargain reform and a victim's rights amendment, both of
49. Source on file with author.
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which might well fall into the category of administrative improvement of the
courts. No specific cases are mentioned; almost any action taken in a specific
case might be consistent with the statements above, except perhaps extensive
plea-bargaining. These slogans should violate the gag rule. A candidate is attempting to gather support by implying he will treat particular litigants
differently.5 0
B. Credentials
Every candidate engaged in some form of credentialing as well. Candidates emphasized their past history to appear qualified to the voters. This is
widely approved of as the most appropriate way to win votes by those calling
for the strictest enforcement of the gag rule.5' Most of it sends only innocuous
signals to the voters, telling them that the candidate has the experience necessary for the position. Candidates point out that they have been judges for fifteen years or are veterans. These signals are unlikely to send messages about
particular types of litigants.
However, this practice may have a different effect when it is used to signal to voters on issues. Again, the major topic area in which this occurs involves crime. Candidates with criminal law experience would emphasize it,
sometimes in a very low key manner. One candidate just listed credentials,
stating that he had been a "U.S. Attorney . . .Chief Assistant Prosecutor...
Special Agent, FBI. '5 2 This is representative of the approach many candidates
with prosecutorial experience took. While highlighting such experience (this
candidate took up one third of his space with these three credentials), they
presented no additional commentary. While this is not a source of tremendous
concern, no campaign literature mentioned criminal defense experience. It
seems rather unlikely that while over half of the candidates had prosecutorial
work to discuss while listing their credentials, no candidate ever reported any
criminal defense work. It may be true that these candidates are not trying to
commit to positions to get votes; it is possible that this sort of subtle emphasis
does not indicate any lack of impartiality. Yet, it does say that candidates at
least feel pressure to make these indications.
Some candidates went further than just listing prosecutorial credentials,
focusing on criminal experience in other branches of government. A candidate
with legislative experience mentioned multiple times his authorship of a
"white-collar crime act and state-wide Grand Jury Act that helped prosecute
criminals" and that "[w]hile in the legislature, he voted to make criminals
work to pay their victims [and] helped pass laws to allow victims to have a
say in sentencing and to require that victims be notified before their attackers
50. I did receive a copy of an August 1996 letter sent to the state judicial standards commission requesting they investigate these statements and take action. I could not find any source
that stated whether formal proceedings were begun. The same letter alleges this candidate distributed copies of an anti-abortion lawsuit he filed before becoming a judge. I did not receive
any literature to that effect.
51. See, e.g., J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Ky. 1991).
52. Source on file with author.
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come up for parole. ' 53 The inherent implication is that this experience is relevant to conduct as a judge and there will be some action on the bench that
corresponds to this work in the legislature.
A different candidate relied more heavily than most on his prosecutorial
experience. "[The candidate] served as a Criminal Prosecutor for the ...District Attorney's office where he earned a reputation as a no-nonsense prosecutor who pushed for maximum sentences for convicted violent criminals. In violent felony cases, [the candidate's] conviction rate was one of [the district's]
highest. '5 4 This too implies that the experience of prosecuting and the attitude
of being no-nonsense and pushing for maximum sentences is relevant as a
judge. The average voter is going to infer that one who pushed for maximum
sentences before the court is going to mete out maximum sentences when he
sits on the bench. This type of bootstrapping legislative and executive experience into judicial races raises an additional concern. The gag rule is predicated
on a model of judging that assumes judges behave differently from legislative
and executive branch members. The model hopes judges will interpret the law
rather than make it. There are certainly grounds on which to criticize this
model of judging, as many commentators have, claiming judges have substantial discretion and use it to further policy goals.55 Given, though, that we have
implicitly adopted this model of judging in the Canons of Judicial Conduct,
candidates substantially undercut it when they blend the judicial experience
with that of other branches.
Candidates also used their judicial records to communicate information.
One pointed out that "[a]s circuit judge, the [candidate] is the ONLY candidate for Supreme Court Judge who has actually thrown criminals in prison and does so gladly. '56 This is the sort of suggestive commentary on one's record that the Buckley court found unobjectionable, but it has the same implications as promising that the candidate will take strict action toward criminals.
The same candidate used his opponent's record in a suggestive manner:
[The opponent] is running for Supreme Court Judge. He claims
he's the only candidate to practice law before the federal court.
In truth, [the opponent] appeared before the federal appeals
court ONLY ONCE - and that was to defend four drug dealers.
These drug kingpins were arrested for selling dope to addict our children . ..robbing them of their innocence . ..and dooming them to
a life of crime and misery.
[The opponent] got paid big bucks to keep his crooked clients
from going to prison.

53. Source on file with author.
54. Source on file with author.
55. See, e.g., Michele Radosevich, Comment, Toward Meaningful Judicial Elections: A
Case for Reform of Canon 7, 17 U. PYGET SOUND L. REv. 139 (1993); Reynolds Cafferata,
Note, A Proposalfor an Empirical Interpretation of Canon 5, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1639 (1992).
56. Source on file with author.
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Crime is shooting through the roof, thanks to liberal judges.
Like the ACLU, [the opponent] would rather coddle law-breakers
than provide justice to the victim.
That's why as a legislator, [the opponent] voted against a bill
requiring convicts to pay for the suffering and pain they caused their
victims.
In5 7 fact, [the opponent] has NEVER sentenced anyone to
prison.
This was accompanied by a picture of a girl in her early teens purchasing
what appear to be drugs from an older, rather disreputable-looking man. This
is another case where the candidate avoids making specific promises on issues,
but still clearly communicates his message.
While crime is the dominant issue in most of the literature I received,
and it is the only issue that appeared in a number of races, it is not the only
one candidates were talking about. Gambling played a major role in one race.
[The opponent] said: "Gambling is not reflective of our state's values." . . .Then [the opponent] broke his word and took thousands of
dollars from casino owners and gambling interests. [The ad went on
to list four donations that the candidate alleges came from casino
owners and attorneys.]
Now you can stop [the opponent] .. .and teach a lesson to politicians like [the opponent] who 5promise
anything to get elected, then
8
ignore the voters they represent!
The outside of this pamphlet contained the opponent's picture with the words
"Broken Promises" printed over it.59 This ad does not clearly convey information to voters telling how the candidate might rule on issues (although it is
likely that anti-gambling voters are going to believe the candidate will rule in
ways they would like). However, the ad highlights the dangers inherent in any
sort of campaign statements containing any policy commentary when made in
judicial races. No context is given for the statement "[g]ambling is not reflective of our state's values." 6 However, assuming that it was made in a judicial
race, the voters are going to reasonably infer that the candidate meant something by it, and that the candidate meant that he or she would act on the basis
of that philosophy if elected. While the statement may or may not be inconsistent with taking money from gambling interests, it does show that judicial candidates who make commentary of this sort may find themselves called on to
defend their actions in light of their promises.
Some candidates tried to use specific cases, opinions, or authorship as
campaign tools. One candidate distributed a copy of a law review article he
had written on labor issues and another on a survey of recent case law from
that state's supreme court. Another distributed a list of all her published opinions. Since all opinions were listed, it is difficult to imagine that specific in57.
58.
59.
60.
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formation was broadcast to voters. No one issue or vote was emphasized over
another. However, when candidates focus on particular opinions, they can send
messages to constituents. One incumbent justice discussed authorship of a major piece of tort reform legislation, and quoted two newspapers on the opinion.
One stated that it "will bring fairness to business owners and others who have
felt-they've unfairly been treated. ' 61 The other called it "a first step toward returning sanity to the [state's] civil judicial system." The same candidate, in a
fund raising letter, emphasized the same opinion:
We are finally moving in the right direction in reforming the Court. I am
especially proud to have written, in my first term as Supreme Court Justice, the opinion that became the cornerstone for historic tort reform legislation passed last year. Finally sanity has been restored to [this state's] punitive damage law. However, there is much more that needs to be done. 62
This, of course, does not promise that in the next case the justice will support
the pro-business position, but it leaves that implication in the mind of the
voter. The inference the candidate desires the voter to draw is that the attitude
underlying that opinion will guide the judge's future jurisprudence. Plaintiffs'
attorneys might be justified in feeling somewhat reticent about appearing
before this particular jurist. In the same vein, another candidate passed out
newspaper articles about a client she represented whose jury verdict she had
preserved on appeal. The client was a woman who was shot by two men hired
by her husband. Of course, representing a client simply means an attorney is
acting as an advocate; taking a case says nothing about how the lawyer might
rule if elected. However, once a candidate decides to select one case out of
the multitude he or she has been involved in and chooses to highlight it in his
or her campaign literature, that case and the position supported takes on particular significance. Voters could reasonably infer that this position had special
meaning to the candidate and that plaintiffs might receive sympathy and thus
fare somewhat better in this court.
C. Endorsements
Publicizing endorsements is another common mechanism used by many
of the candidates. They gather votes by telling their constituents who else supports them. The most innocuous endorsements, of course, come from family
members. More complicated issues arise when the endorsements are from
community groups or individuals in the community who clearly represent a
certain position. A candidate tells the voters how he might rule in drug cases
by saying: "No wonder [the candidate] has the wide spread support of law enforcement officers like [county sheriff], who said: 'A drug dealer does not
want to come into [the candidate's] court."' 63 Not too far from this is an endorsement publicized by another candidate from a law enforcement group:

61. Source on file with author.
62. Source on file with author.
63. Source on file with author.
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[The candidate's] strong stand on the punishment of violent criminals and
compassion for the victims of their crimes should be commended.
His stand that criminals should be accountable for their actions is applauded by our members. This type of true 'punishment of the guilty' perspective is what the people of [this state] expect of their elective
representatives. 4
It serves no benefit to allow candidates to signal voters by including third
party quotes that the candidates themselves could not or would not say.
While the attached quotes exacerbate these examples, very often mere endorsement and the candidate's decision to publicize it is sufficient to send the
signal to the voters. Multiple candidates indicated that they had been endorsed
by the National Rifle Association. Given the well-known position of the
N.R.A. on many legal issues that might come before a court, candidates are
making some implications about their position on gun control when they put
this endorsement in their literature. Whether or not they intend to follow the
N.R.A.'s stance on these issues, the voters are likely to infer and expect that
the candidate will do so. Chamber of Commerce endorsements, presented by a
smattering of candidates, do not have same the inflammatory nature as those
by the N.R.A., but they are included for a reason and send a message to a
voter: the candidate understands the concerns of business owners. These types
of endorsements are most effective with the people who pay the most attention
to them, single-issue voters. If the only issue a constituent cares about is gun
65
control, he or she is going to look closely at the N.R.A. endorsements.
Lawyer endorsements were common in a number of the materials the
candidates distributed. These endorsements can be particularly effective in judicial races, as many voters feel inadequately informed about candidates 66 and
turn to lawyers who are assumed to know more about the candidates. Lawyer
endorsements, though, implicate the same ethical concerns that led to the ban
on soliciting contributions from lawyers or even accepting them without first
passing them through a campaign committee. 67 Of course, endorsements, unlike money, are not the root of all evil, but the potential for prejudice is still
there, if somewhat reduced. This is particularly serious when the candidates
are running for courts with statewide jurisdiction. Judges with jurisdiction over
only a limited portion of the state could theoretically garner endorsements
from outside their district. State supreme courts, however, can potentially rule
on any case filed by any attorney.
One endorsement is present in every partisan head-to-head race: the endorsement of a political party. Candidates run on a party ticket, aligning themselves (generally) with one of two camps. While this does make a generalized
64. Source on file with author.
65. Some candidates give a large number of endorsements, perhaps a dozen or so. This is
unlikely to lead to an inference that they will favor certain litigants and more likely to imply
they are active in the community, an implication that does not conflict with the Canon. However, this is only true if the endorsements span the political spectrum, rather than being clustered in one region. Candidates often list several endorsements from police organizations and
none from criminal defense groups.
66. See Radosevich, supra note 55, at 140 (quoting the former Washington Attorney General as stating he was "clueless when it came to some of the county judges").
67. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Canon 5(C)(2).
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comment on where the candidate might stand on a myriad of issues, the question of partisan versus non-partisan races is not one to be answered by the Canons. The state legislature determines the type of elections in which judges
will run. Even in partisan elections, though, candidates can focus with particular strength on their party membership and signal how they might decide particular cases. A Republican candidate had the following fund raising letter distributed on his behalf:
Nothing should be more important to Republican lawyers than the
capture of the [state] Supreme Court. For the first time this century that
goal is within sight.

With a few notable exceptions, the Bar is dominated by Democrat attorneys. One reason for that dominance is the perceived career and political disadvantage of being a Republican ....
If we elect a Republican Chief Justice, no young attorney will feel the
need to register as a Democrat in order to preserve the opportunity to
serve in the Judiciary. The perception of Democratic dominance will be
laid to rest for good.

A lot of big money is pouring into [the opponent's] campaign. The
tide is with us, but we cannot win this race without the participation of
every Republican attorney. We all have a stake in this race. The new Chief
Justice will serve for eight years. Our chance to change the political culture of the state will not occur again this century.

Anyone hesitant to openly challenge the incumbent should know that
every attorney can give up to (and including) $100.00 to the campaign
without appearing on a finance report. A spouse can give an additional
$100.00. Those not worried about openly taking a stand can give up to
$4,000.00.

Please send your contribution today to bring about a better (state] and
68
the beginning of the Republican era in our state judiciary.
No commitments are made and no policies are discussed, yet this text
goes substantially beyond ordinary party identification. It gives a sense that
Republican lawyers fare better in front of Republican judges. It furthers the

68. Source on file with author.
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suspicion that rulings are apt to divide along party lines and that partisan
politics partially determines who wins cases.
Newspaper endorsements, particularly from large commercial papers, generally do not implicate concerns regarding a particular class of litigants; they
tend to be based on experience rather than particular issue positions. 69 One paper, however, included a column from a local college student who endorsed
the judge. The student's older brother and his wife had been murdered nine
years before.
[The candidate] presided over this very prominent trial ....
The suspect was found guilty of two counts of premeditated murder.
When it came time to sentence him, [the candidate] was 'firm but fair.'
He sentenced the man to 90 years in prison .... [The candidate] said
he wished he could have done more.
When I was in sixth grade, my class went on a trip to the courthouse.
[The candidate] showed a clip of the trial and talked about it a little while.
I'll never forget what he said next.
"I gave this man as much as the law would allow me to. Unfortunately, I couldn't do any more."
Thanks to [the candidate], I and the rest of my family can sleep a lot
better at night knowing this man is off the streets . . . . So many times,
criminals get off scot free and never pay the price for the brutal crimes
they commit.
I'd like you to remember my and my sister-in-law's family's experience when you step into the voting booth on Nov. 5. Remember that [the
candidate] is a fair man and cares about the families of victims. He is a
man of honor and serves justice to those who deserve to pay. He helps
keep [this state] safe by keeping criminals off the street.70
The Canon does not and should not hold candidates responsible for what
supporters say about them. 7' Naturally, if a candidate solicits commentary or
deliberately disseminates it widely, then it becomes his or her own statement.
From the literature I received, there is no evidence that this article was either
solicited or distributed by the candidate. However, this commentary was used
in a race and shows a clear mechanism for avoiding the Canon. No conceivable regulation could constitutionally limit a voter's right to write an opinion
column about a candidate for office; these statements are at the core of the
First Amendment. Yet, by this mechanism, voters can receive the very signals
the Canon is trying to prevent. The judge need not make an explicit commitment and the voters still have the opportunity to base their decision on the
judge's position on the issues. This also highlights the utility of recusal as the
correct remedy in these cases. No sanction can or should be filed against the
author of such a piece. Reprimanding or punishing a candidate in some other
69. Specialized newspapers can cause a problem. See Deters v. Judicial Retirement and
Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1994). In Deters, the candidate made statements in a
Catholic newspaper. See id. There was no indication of whether the newspaper endorsed him. If
it had, and he publicized it, that might imply particular stances on positions, especially abortion.
70. Source on file with author.
71. The exception is when the supporters are family members. The gag rule requires candidates to encourage family to abide by the Canons if the family member is acting in support of
the judicial candidate.
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way is also inappropriate, particularly if there is no reason to think the candidate was involved in soliciting the third party statement. Recusal avoids punishing the candidate, protects the rights of litigants, and reduces the incentive
for candidates to try and find third parties to endorse them suggestively.72
Of course, not all candidates used these mechanisms to signal voters.
Several distributed brochures which simply contained the names of the candidates, a list of their credentials without any particular focus on one position,
slogans with minimal implied content, and only neutral endorsements. While it
is admirable that many take this approach, it is not sufficient if the Canon is
to be effective. The incentive to make suggestive commentary is very high. I
focused on the more creative literature for the same reasons voters will-it is
inherently more interesting. The Canon is designed to preclude candidates
from making commitments about actions they will take if elected to the bench.
It simply is not fulfilling that function, particularly in the area of crime. Candidates can and do engage in a contest of who will commit to punishing
criminals more severely. This is the very activity that the gag rule is designed
to prevent. Part III attempts to determine why candidates have this ability. The
answer lies in the interpretation that courts have placed upon the Canon.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
While the drafters of the Model Code play a substantial role in the process of determining what speech is prohibited, courts are the final arbiters. Of
course, the American Bar Association has no power to codify the Canons on
its own. Implementation and enforcement is the exclusive province of the state
legislatures and the court system. 73 Below I analyze the major federal and state
gag rule cases. 74 For the most part, the courts have inadequately recognized
the implied content of messages that candidates send to voters. Section A
shows that a reason for this is that courts have not focused on the policy goal
that is the appropriate motivating factor for the Canon. Courts have not paid
72. The recusal solution is less effective here. Judges simply cannot recuse from all criminal cases. However, some narrower range of recusal could be drawn. It might be possible for
judges not to sit on drug cases if they became a campaign issue. Hopefully, though, the threat
of forced recusal would encourage candidates not to make comments contrary to the Canon.
73. The process for enforcing these codes varies from state to state. Until about fifty
years ago, judicial conduct was only subject to punishment by the executive, impeachment, or
recall. See Edward J. Schoenbaum, A Historical Look at Judicial Discipline, 54 CHI.-KENT L.
RaV. 1, 1-9 (1978). More appropriate ways of enforcing ethics codes developed as it became apparent that these mechanisms were too crude and too rarely used to be effective. States moved
toward judicial review of judges' behavior, placing discipline in the hands of state supreme
courts. See id. at 13-18. The recent innovation has been quasi-independent bodies, empowered
with the ability to investigate complaints. Every state now has some independent organization to
review judicial conduct. See IRENE A. TESITOR & DWIGHT B. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANI-

2 (2d ed. 1980). These organizations have many forms, but generally can investigate alleged violations and make recommendations for action to the state's highest court, which remains the final arbiter in judicial disciplinary cases.
74. Federal court cases have only arisen in the context of constitutional challenges to the
Canon on either vagueness, or far more commonly, on First Amendment grounds. The state
court cases tend to involve the direct question of whether a judicial candidate should be
disciplined.
ZATIONs

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:209

attention to the right of litigants to get a fair trial. Section B looks at the types
of messages to which courts have reacted. In general, even when the courts articulate the correct standard, which is protecting litigant's rights, they fail to
note the danger in suggestive commentary.
A. Litigants' Rights
In most cases, courts have failed to recognize that the goal of the Canon
is to protect the right to a fair trial. Unless this is seen as the goal, courts will
never focus on whether candidate statements indicate a predisposition to a particular litigant. The Supreme Court of Arizona dealt with the question of judicial speech in In re Riley75 and exemplified the error the courts tend to make.
The error was not the final outcome. 76 Whether Riley violated the Canon is
not clear. What is clear is that the court did not consider the appropriate interests when making its determination. It found that maintaining the public reputation of the courts was the interest:
Lawyers who are candidates for judicial office may not impugn the integrity of the judicial system or question the decisions of the judge.... Lawyers may make fair comment on the judge's fitness so long as the comment does not call in to question decisions of the court or question the
integrity of the judicial system. For example, a lawyer may criticize a
judge for unnecessary delay in reaching a decision, but may not question
the decision itself except on appeal. This is not to say, however, that a
lawyer may not publicly disagree with a judge's decision. Proper avenues
for questioning a decision include the appellate route and disciplinary proceedings where appropriate. What we condemn is conduct which denigrates the judicial
system as a whole and undermines the public's confi77
dence in it.
When a candidate questions a ruling of his opponent, he may or may not
indicate a particular tendency to favor a class of litigants. Pointing out an error in logic or law in an opinion says nothing about how a candidate may rule
in future cases. It does not even necessarily indicate that the candidate would
overrule the opinion, depending on the candidate's view of the role of precedent. The conduct to be condemned is not that which makes judges look bad
in the eyes of voters; it is the conduct which causes litigants to be treated unfairly in court.
The first federal case to challenge the constitutionality of the gag rule,
Berger v. Supreme Court of Ohio,78 involved relatively innocuous statements.
75. 691 P.2d 695 (Ariz. 1984).
76. In that case, the respondent had an extended history of conflict with an incumbent
judge which culminated in running against him for the seat. The challenger criticized the incumbent for issuing a contempt order against the challenger, saying: "[I]t's crazy, it's absolutely insane" and was "motivated by revenge on the part of [the incumbent]." Id. at 703-04. The court
found these statements to be violations. The challenger also commented on the incumbent's
"lack of judicial temperament and unpredictability," which the court found to be protected
speech. See id. at 704.
77. Id.
78. 598 F Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984), aff'd, 1988 WL 114792 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming
essentially for the grounds stated in the district court opinion).
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Berger wanted to promise to make litigants in divorce cases appear without
their attorneys and go through mediation.7 9 The Ohio Disciplinary Counsel had
taken the position that "'candidates should refer only to their background,
awards they have received and endorsements from groups that support
them."' 80 When considering the merits, the court discussed the possibility that
the impartiality of the judiciary might be impaired by campaign commentary,
but emphasized that "[t]he state has a compelling interest in assuring that its
elected judges are protected from untruthful criticism and that judicial campaigns are run in a manner so as not to damage the actual and perceived integrity of state 8 judges
and the bar; hence, the provision against
1
misrepresentation."
The more serious concern is the truthful criticism: candidates stating that
cases were decided incorrectly. While Berger's printed statements indicated little bias toward a particular group of litigants, the court here was focused only
on the harm to judge's reputations, not on the potential damage to litigants.
No federal cases on the gag rule came for several years following Berger.
American Civil Liberties Union v. Florida Bar,8 2 like Berger, was a preemptive strike on the Canon in which the candidate filed for a preliminary injunction. The candidate involved wanted to both announce his views on disputed
issues and criticize the incumbent. 3 The heart of the ACLU analysis of the
Canon came when the court looked at the first prong of the test for a preliminary injunction: the likelihood the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits. In
looking to the state's interest in prohibiting this type of speech, the court did
mention that judicial candidates cannot appropriately bind themselves in campaigns and still act in a judicial capacity.84 However, the court did little more
than cite the proposition - the analysis seems driven by other concerns, focusing on the fact that lawyers can be held to higher ethical standards than the
79. Furthermore, he criticized the use of trial referees as excessive and cited deficiencies
in the handling of domestic relations disputes. See id. at 72. He also wanted to discuss an undisclosed "platform." See id.
80. Id. at 73 (quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Hon. Loren E. Souers, Jr., Case Number
DD843). The Counsel took the position that "the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits candidates
for judicial office from making comments that are critical of the incumbent, regardless of the
truth or falsity of those allegations." Id. These positions are inadequate because they are both
under and over inclusive. Commentary on the incumbent usually will involve signaling a position with respect to particular litigants, but will not always. However, as was seen earlier, endorsements from groups, and the decision to emphasize some endorsements over others, often
clearly indicate a judge's stance on cases. See infra notes 47 - 60 and accompanying text. Despite these comments from the Disciplinary Counsel, the court refused to accept that the Ohio
Supreme Court would interpret the Canon the same way, saving it constitutionally by allowing
promises of administrative reform. The Commentary to the Model Code now explicitly allows
promises of administrative reform. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, commentary accompanying
Canon 5.
81. Berger, 598 F Supp. at 75.
82. 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990).
83. He believed such action would necessarily involve indicating his views. See id. The
opinion does not indicate the statements he wished to make.
84. ACLU, 744 F. Supp. at 1097. The Court cites to Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565
F2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), which dealt with a requirement that a judge resign before announcing
a candidacy for a non-judicial office.
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general public. 5 The court analogized the gag rule to the ban on attorney advertising, where the key concern was that the advertisements would be misleading. This analogy is misplaced.8 6 The problem in cases of judicial
campaigning is not that the statements might be misleading; it is that they
might mean exactly what they say. Judges will be able to commit to positions
to win votes and will find themselves forced to do so. The information judges
may want to give is not relevant, unlike the messages in attorney advertisements, because we have deemed it not relevant. We do not want voters basing
their choices on how judges may decide cases. The court concluded:
The court also thinks that the state wrongly assumes that members of a
respected and learned profession cannot announce their views on legal and/
or political issues without undermining the public's confidence in the objectivity of the judiciary. As to relevance, the court is acutely aware that
judges routinely exercise their discretion within the confines of the facts
and the law. How judges choose to exercise that discretion is a matter of
much concern to litigants, lawyers, and the public alike. That concern
makes a judicial candidate's views on disputed legal and political issues
anything but irrelevant.8 7
The fact the public wants to base its votes on how the judiciary uses its
discretion does not make it acceptable. Since the important competing interest
of providing impartial courts exists, the case for the Canon is much stronger
than this court recognized. The concern is not for the public's confidence in
the judicial objectivity, it is for the objectivity itself.88
Only one federal court case has recognized and given significant weight
to the important state interest in preventing candidates from signaling voters
about how they might decide cases. Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement
and Removal Commission 9 is a well-reasoned and well-argued look at the
competing interests underlying the gag rule. Ackerson ran for the Kentucky in85. See id.
86. The Supreme Court held in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), that
blanket bans on attorney advertising were unconstitutional. The ACLU court, in discussing this
opinion stated "[sluggesting that the public was being underestimated, the Court said that if the
naivete of the public causes attorney advertising to be misleading, the proper remedy is more
disclosure of information rather than less." ACLU, 744 F. Supp. at 1098. The ACLU court went
on to examine Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
"[T]he Court once again emphasized that there is a presumption favoring disclosure of information over concealment, for 'disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a
positive contribution to decision-making than is concealment of such information."' Id. (quoting
Peel, 496 U.S. at 108).
87. ACLU, 744 F. Supp. at 1099.
88. This case was followed by ACLU v. Florida Bar, 999 F.2d 1486 (1lth Cir. 1993),
where a candidate was found to have standing to challenge Canon 7(B)(1)(a) of the Florida
Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires candidates for judicial office to "maintain the dignity
appropriate to judicial office." That case was remanded to the district court, where no decision
has been handed down yet. No direct appeal was taken in the first ACLU case, but a permanent
injunction against enforcement of the gag rule was put in place. See ACLU, 999 F.2d at 1489,
n.4.
89. 776 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Ky. 1991). Ackerson involved the new Kentucky Code which
was identical to the 1990 Model Code. The old Kentucky gag rule was found unconstitutional
by the state supreme court. See infra notes 111 - 119 and accompanying text.
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termediate appellate court and expressed an interest in making statements
about the administrative matters facing the court. 90 He also wanted to discuss
general legal principles, including the right to privacy, the role of United
States Supreme Court precedent, and the use of the federal rules of evidence
in state court. 91 He alleged that he feared sanction from the state disciplinary
board if he made these comments. In its analysis of whether the Code is narrowly tailored, 92 the court distinguished between comments involving administrative matters and those involving adjudicatory issues. It held that restriction
of administrative commentary was not acceptable because it was not narrowly
tailored to further the compelling government interest - the impartiality of
the court toward particular litigants was not affected. 93 However, when looking
at the prohibitions on commentary involving substantive rulings, the court
found:
[T]here is a compelling state interest in so limiting a judicial candidate's
speech, because the making of campaign commitments on issues likely to
come before the court tends to undermine the fundamental fairness and impartiality of the legal system. .

.

.[P]re-election commitments by judicial

candidates impair the integrity of the court by making the candidate appear
to have pre-judged an issue without benefit of argument of
counsel, appli94
cable law, and the particular facts presented in each case.
The Ackerson court took an additional step rejected by every other federal court. It recognized that no real difference exists between explicit
promises of decisions and implied bias toward a particular litigant. "The Canon's proscription of the appearance of a commitment obviously addresses
commitments made indirectly as opposed to those made directly. It is axiomatic that if one may not do something directly, one may not do it indirectly." 95 While the Ackerson court found this axiomatic, the next section
shows that no other federal court and few state courts have done likewise.
B. Implicit Signaling
Courts generally have not recognized the dangers of implied commitments in candidate statements. Federal court cases have been particularly derelict in this regard. 96 In Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, 97 the Seventh
Circuit ruled the 1974 version of the gag rule unconstitutional as Buckley
claimed a First Amendment right to point out that he had never voted to overturn a rape conviction. It is hard to imagine why Buckley would make this
90. These included the case backlog, case assignment, number of cases pending, personnel decisions, and travel expenses.
91. Ackerson, 776 . Supp. at 311.
92. The court easily found a compelling state interest in "an evenhanded, unbiased and
impartial judiciary." Id. at 313.
93. See id. at 314.
94. Id. at 315.
95. Id. at 314.
96. These cases tend to appear in federal court based on challenges to the constitutionality of the gag rule. Courts evaluate the harm of the statement in an attempt to determine the
strength of the state interest in eliminating them.
97. 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
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sort of statement except to intentionally send the signal that he knew would be
received; he would rule against rapists if elected. 9 Perhaps his impartiality
would not have been compromised, but the statement certainly was intended to
imply it would be. 99 The Buckley court viewed the Canon as reaching well
into the realm of protected speech - it had "the benefit of the insight into the
scope of such a rule as is provided by a ruling such as that of the Illinois
Courts Commission that condemned so innocuous a statement as a candidate's
report of his past record in ruling on a particular type of case." ° Presumably,
the court would not have found "I will never reverse a rape conviction" innocuous, but that is exactly what Buckley's statement implied.
The Third Circuit came out with a position directly opposite from that of
the Seventh Circuit. Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania'0 found the Canon constitutional. Samuel C. Stretton wanted to
discuss a wide variety of issues, including the need for the election of judges
with an activist judicial philosophy who would consider changes in society
when making rulings, his views on criminal sentencing and the rights of victims of crime, the meaning of reasonable doubt, and the importance of a basic
constitutional right to privacy. 0 2 Without much discussion, the court found the
Canon constitutional as applied to these statements. 0 3 While the court might
have meant the statements were not protected speech, the decision's tone is
more consistent with the interpretation that the "as applied" challenge failed
for another reason. Officers of the body charged with enforcing the Canon asserted that they would not consider these statements violations. This is a serious failure to recognize implicit signaling. Statements about being an activist
judge who believes in the right to privacy implicate a host of values; at a minimum, they strongly imply a pro-choice perspective on abortion and an opposition to sodomy laws. It is doubtful that any attorney representing a pro-life
98. See id. at 229.
99. In contrast to later decisions, Buckley seemed to focus on protecting the rights of litigants. The court found the Canon unconstitutional because it "reaches far beyond speech that
could reasonably be interpreted as committing the candidate in a way that would comprise his
impartiality should he be successful in the election." Id. at 228. However, the court did not explain how this standard permits the statements Buckley made regarding rape.
100. Id. at 230. The Buckley court avoided a direct conflict with Stretton, discussed infra,
by distinguishing it on the grounds that the Stretton court had the luxury of reading the Canon
narrowly since there was no state court interpretation.
101. 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
102. See id. at 139.
103. See id. at 140. The court's analysis of the facial challenge is much better. Stretton
makes a far more significant investigation into the concern over providing litigants a fair trial
than, say, ACLU, discussed infra. Rather than the misplaced analogy to lawyer advertisements,
the court compared the restriction to the Hatch Act ban on campaigning by government officials, a step Congress was permitted to take to make sure "governmental employees . . . 'avoid
practicing political justice."' Id. at 141 (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). The court found a compelling interest in
promulgating the Canon because "[i]f judicial candidates during a campaign prejudge cases that
later come before them, the concept of impartial justice becomes a mockery." Id. at 142. On the
tailoring prong, the court chose to read the Canon narrowly, asserting that the prohibition on announcing views on disputed legal or political issues only applied to issues likely to come before
the court. The court interpreted the statute this way to preserve constitutionality, finding that a
broader reading violated the First Amendment. See id.
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organization would be pleased to draw Judge Stretton. While the content of
the statements regarding reasonable doubt, criminal sentencing, and the rights
of victims are not clear from the opinion, certainly any criminal defense lawyer would attempt to discover the content of the platform before appearing in
this court. These statements indicate how Stretton would decide cases.
Decided just ten days after Stretton, Beshear v. Butt' °4 came to the opposite conclusion about the Canon. Unlike the preceding cases, Sanford Beshear
had actually been accused of violating the gag rule. 105 Beshear had stated during his campaign that he found plea bargains unacceptable and would not allow them in his court, and sued in federal court for a declaratory judgement
that the Canon was unconstitutional. °6 The Beshear court gave little weight to
the motivating factor-protecting litigants-that lay behind the Canon. The
court seemed to think that no state interest was implicated if the issues were
open and above board. The court found it sufficient that the "[p]laintiff has
shown that his utterances were made in good faith and not designed to mislead the public or pose a clear and present danger to the community."' 1 7 The
bias to a particular group of litigants inherent in the statement "I will not allow plea bargains in my court"' 18 may not be immediately apparent, but it is
real and does pose a danger. It is a bias against defendants who are clearly
guilty and prosecutors with relatively less serious crimes. Those defendants
who have obviously committed a very serious crime will get tried and convicted for longer sentences than if they had pled. Similarly, prosecutors will
not have the capacity to bring the less serious cases. The state has the right to
prevent judges from making these decisions in order to get elected.
As in the Ackerson case, Kentucky provides an exception to the general
errors courts have made. 0 9 In Deters v. Judicial Retirement and Removal
104. 773 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Ark. 1991), rev'd, 996 F.2d 1458 (8th Cir. 1992), available
in 1992 WL 119188, on remand, 863 F.Supp. 913 (1994)(holding Canon unconstitutional).
105. Id. at 1234.
106. See id. at 1231. The court concluded by holding the speech protected because:
Judge Beshear in no way was advocating any unlawful activities or seeking to
breach the peace in any way. Judge Beasher was endeavoring to voice ideas and
policies that he would institute, if elected, to cope with the increasing crime rate.
Obviously, the policies would be implemented in open court and in the presence of
all interested parties and not in secrecy or in an arbitrary or oppressive manner.
107. Id. at 1233.
108. See infra Part II for similar 1996 campaign statements.
109. Kentucky only did so on its second try. J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky.
1991) placed the Kentucky Supreme Court in a difficult position; their newest member was
before them on disciplinary charges stemming from his election. Justice Combs had the "fireman's rule," laws against felons carrying handguns, and the standard for court review of workers' compensation cases. The court correctly found a compelling government interest in "prevent[ing] campaign statements which may indicate a predisposition or bias in favor of one
litigant over another." Id. at 956. However, the court erred in not considering the judge's statements to be "a pledge of preferential treatment to one class of persons over another." Id. Justice
Combs said he did not like laws against felons carrying handguns. See id. The public has two
ways to interpret this statement when made by a candidate. First, it could assume the candidate
meant nothing by it, and said it for no reason. More likely, though, the voter is going to decide
Combs meant to communicate some information by it, and the most sensible inference the public can draw is: vote for Combs if you do not like the law, because it will be weaker in some
way if he is on the bench.
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Commission,11° the court easily found a compelling government interest and
held this version of the Code constitutional."' The Deters decision stands out
not because of the constitutional ruling, but because of the language it sanctioned. Deters described himself as "a pro-life candidate.""' 2 While this is
more direct than the comment Buckley made about rape convictions, Deters
stands out for prohibiting a statement that is less than an explicit
3
commitment. 1
Unfortunately, though, this opinion is unique in this regard. Courts have
shown a reluctance to sanction implied promises. As noted earlier, judges have
never been disciplined for making suggestive record comments. 1 4 Nor do
cases exist where candidates have faced charges for emphasizing endorsements
from particular groups. It is not just that state supreme courts do not sanction
candidates when these cases are presented; the cases apparently never come
before the courts.' '5 That courts have not adequately focused on the right to
impartial adjudication has led to the failure to sanction implied commitments. 16 Implied commitments do not undermine the concerns that have motivated courts, such as protecting the image of the judiciary. However, this failure to sanction has serious consequences, as seen in Part II. A functional
interpretation that prohibits statements indicating preferential treatment of one
class of litigants over another cures this problem.
110. 873 S.W.2d 200 (Ky. 1994).
111. Id. at 204.
112. Id. at 203.
113. Deters did not help himself, though. He stated that "hopefully" the statement would
provide him "a distinct edge in the race" since "you're in it to win. You do what it takes." Id.
Given the failure of other courts to recognize implied promises, a less candid candidate might
have fared better before the court.
114. See supra note 7.
115. A rare case even mentioning the consequences of implied promises was In re Stoker,
827 P.2d 986 (Wa. 1992), which lay outside the gag rule context. The court had to determine
whether a candidate's appearance at the Democrat and Republican county fair booths violated
the non-partisan requirements in Washington judicial elections. The Disciplinary Commission
found Stoker violated the Canons, as "[a] given fairgoer, passing the booth [Judge Stoker] was
occupying at the time, would be given the distinct impression that he was supported or endorsed
by that political party." Id. at 995. The court rejected this interpretation, holding that "[w]hile
we must hold judges and judicial candidates to the highest standards of conduct, we must, at the
same time, avoid, without a clear factual basis, reading into proper conduct 'implied' results
which constitute violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct." Id. This case does not control the
court decisions on gag rule violations, but demonstrates a reluctance to enforce except in clearcut circumstances.
116. Explicit commitments of action are more frequently sanctioned. The Indiana Supreme
Court reprimanded a candidate in the 1996 county court election who distributed literature
which pledged that he would "stop suspending sentences" and "stop putting criminals on probation." In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740 (Ind. 1997). The court recognized that this was essentially a
commitment to decide cases "without regard to evidence or the applicable rules of law." Id. at
741. The State of Washington sanctioned promises to be the "toughest on drunk driving" and
statements that he was "tough on drunk driving," as "singl[ing] out a special class of defendants
and suggest[ing] that the DWI defendants' cases will be held to a higher standard when tried
before [this judge]." In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 396 (Wa. 1988). In cases with a straightforward
and obvious violation of the Canon, state supreme courts tend to correctly look at whether a litigant's right has been infringed.
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IV. CONCLUSION

An interpretation of the Canon precluding speech indicating a bias for or
against particular litigants has two additional major advantages over the current system. First, it meets the constitutional requirements of the First Amendment. 17 A rule requiring judicial recusal if the judge shows a predisposition
toward one type of litigants or another is clearly narrowly tailored to serve the
goal of providing impartial adjudication. The only question is whether this interest is compelling.
The interest is compelling because the right protected is constitutional.
Litigants have a constitutional due process right to a fair and unbiased hearing."t8 The Supreme Court has established that failure to recuse in cases in
which a judge has a personal interest contravenes due process. Most recently,
in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 119 the Court held that Aetna's due process rights were violated when an Alabama Supreme Court justice heard a
failure to pay a claim case in which he had an interest.120 "[U]nder the Due
Process Clause no judge 'can be a judge in his own case [or be] permitted to
try cases where he has an interest in the outcome." ' '2 Judges who make cam122
paign commitments certainly have a direct interest in the outcome.
Another major advantage of this functional interpretation is that it provides a clear and natural sanction. Judges who exhibit a bias in this manner
would be required to act as they do whenever they have a bias. They would
be required to recuse themselves. Enforcement of the Canons of judicial ethics
has always been complicated. While states have the power to issue a wide variety of sanctions, including reprimanding judges, suspension, or even removal,
117. Gag rule constitutionality has sparked much debate and has been the primary topic in
the literature on this section of the Code. See supra note 8. The concern was most serious under
the 1974 version, prohibiting discussion of "disputed legal or political issues." MODEL CODE Canon 7 (1974). Indeed, it led the A.B.A. to alter the language to its current form.
118. This argument relies heavily on a similar claim made in Shepard, supra note 12, at
1089.
119. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
120. The claim alleged insurer bad faith. At the time of the decision, the justice was a
party in two separate Alabama lawsuits against insurance companies alleging a bad-faith failure
to pay a claim. See id. at 813. The Court recognized that while bias did not support disqualification at common law, views had changed, and disqualification was the norm. See id. at 820.
The Court pointed to the Model Code's call for recusal if the judge is biased.
121. Id. at 822 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
122. At a minimum, they do not want to appear to have gone back on their word. The
Court in Aetna did indicate that the judge must have a pecuniary stake in the outcome. See
Aetna, 475 U.S. at 828. However, older opinions do not share this perspective. In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133 (1955), found a violation when a judge sat as both the judge and grand jury.
Rather than find a violation of the constitutional right to a grand jury (U.S. CONST. Amend. VI),
the Court analyzed the case on due process grounds. Finding that the "interest" a judge must
have to find a due process violation "cannot be defined with precision," Murchison, 349 U.S. at
136, the Court noted that his observation of the grand jury testimony skewed the judge's perspective and that he could not free himself from the influence of being part of the prosecution,
albeit briefly. See id. at 137-38 n.8 (Apparently the trial judge here did consider himself part of
the prosecution.). If briefly taking an advocate role violates due process, indicating a preference
for certain parties should also be.
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and have used each of these at some time,'2 3 these tend to be crude methods
and not very closely tied to the offense. 2 4 The problems with enforcement are
particularly severe in the context of elections. Courts are hesitant about invalidating elections based on Code violations. 25 Yet any other sanction is inadequate; the candidate will have already won the prize. 26 Failure to find an adequate remedy is rooted in misunderstanding the fundamental goal of the gag
rule. If the gag rule were concerned with protecting the public's view of the
judiciary, then no sanction would be adequate because the damage is already
done. However, if the view is that the gag rule is supposed to protect the
rights of litigants to a fair trial, the remedy is obvious. 127 Commitments are
eliminated by preventing the candidate from making them credible. The litigant's right to an impartial hearing implies a right to a different judge. 128
123. See SHAMAN, supra note 20, at 7.
124. Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert Finely argues that "the basic deficiency of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics is a lack of an appropriate method of enforcement." See Robert J.
Martineau, Enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410. One commentator claims that essentially no good remedies can possibly exist. See ELECTING JUSTICE,
supra note 1, at 82.
125. For instance, Minnesota has determined that absent criminality, gag rule violations are
not sufficient to invalidate an election. See Burns v. Valen, 400 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987).
126. Examples of this can be seen in some of the cases cited above. While a reprimand is
appropriate since Haan lost his Indiana judgeship race, what recourse would be available had he
won? See In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ind. 1997). Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court
avoided a tremendous headache by declaring their gag rule unconstitutional. The suggested
sanction for Justice Combs was three-month suspension without pay. See J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R.,
803 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Ky. 1991). This provides little comfort for attorneys who come before the
court with cases involving either workman's compensation or felons carrying firearms; both subjects on which Justice Combs campaigned. See id.
127. The Canons already mandate disqualification in this circumstance. Canon 3(E)(1) governs disqualification: "A judge shall disqualify himself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned ..
" The Second Circuit has declined to find recusal
constitutionally mandated. See Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir. 1993). Brown participated in
a highly publicized robbery of a Brink's armored truck. The trial lasted months, and after he
was convicted he filed a habeas action alleging, among other errors, prejudice against him on
the part of the trial judge. See id. at 1248. When the judge ran for reelection, he used the
Brink's case, "tout[ing] the conviction and tough sentence." Id. The court found that:
[N]o one can be surprised if campaign literature exploits community concern
about crime. What the trial judge said during his reelection may well justify disapproval by the bar, the state legislature, or a discerning electorate, but it is not fundamentally different from the kind of appeal that elected judges make when they
urge that they are tough on crime, or compassionate, or strict with polluters.
Id. at 1248-49.
128. Recusal for campaign statements is rare. Indeed, there is "only [one] reported instance of a judge's campaign statements leading to a successful recusal motion." ELECTING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 20. In State ex rel. LaRussa v. Himes, 197 So. 762 (Fla. 1940) (en banc),
the court forced Judge Himes to recuse based on his campaign comments. He had stated that
"the people are shot down in cold blood; the people are assaulted and their homes broken into,
and what the people want is a judge who will put people like Philip LaRussa and his associates
away ..
" Id. at 762. On another occasion, Himes stated that "people like Philip LaRussa and
his associates cannot come into Court and get a license for gambling by a fine or to violate lottery laws by a fine, but he would put them in Uail] where they belonged." Id. Understandably,
when Himes was elected and LaRussa came before him on a charge of violating the lottery
laws, he was apprehensive and moved for a writ requiring Himes to recuse. The court did not
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The problems now facing the gag rule are serious but not insurmountable.
Courts have turned their backs on the traditional goal of the Canon: protecting
litigants. While they have prevented candidates from making explicit commitments of action, the multitude of implied commitments candidates are making
have exactly the same effect. The solution to this is to reconsider the way
courts have looked at the gag rule. If a candidate makes statements indicating
a propensity to favor one type of litigant over another, they should be required
to recuse themselves from cases involving those sorts of parties. Under the
current system, candidates have the means to send the signals to voters that
we do not want them to hear; they have the capacity to give the voters the
promises the Canon is designed to suppress. Until courts more accurately interpret the Canon or the language is changed, it will not be effective at
preventing the electoral process from interfering with litigants' rights.

analyze the case under the Canon of Judicial Ethics, but rather under the general Florida recusal
statute. See id. at 763. The court held that "when a candidate for the judiciary [announces his
position on policies and issues], he disqualifies himself to sit in any cause affecting the issue he
advocates." Id. at 763. Unfortunately, this rule has not taken hold nationwide or even in the
state of Florida in cases involving Judge Himes. See State ex rel. Fuente v. Himes, 36 So. 2d
433, 434 (Fla. 1948) (holding that defendant could not raise a disqualification claim based on
the same statements from the 1940 campaign due to procedural default).

